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The Concept of Democracy and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
Dr. Joseph Zand* 
  
Abstract 
  The European Convention on Human Rights, for the most part, 
guarantees civil and political rights.1  It is a unique international in-
strument that provides what is widely regarded as the most effective 
trans-national judicial process for complaints brought by citizens and 
organizations against their respective governments.2  The aim of this 
article is to contribute to the continuing debate on the notion of de-
mocracy according to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Not only has the Convention been a standard-setter in Europe, but it 
is also a source of inspiration in promotion of democracy and demo-
cratic values for other regions of the world. With this in mind, the ar-
ticle considers the appropriate elements of the Convention which di-
rectly concerns democratic values.  To that end, the article critically 
examines the relevant Articles of the Convention on the notion of 
democracy as well as on the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.  Furthermore, in recent decades, the Convention has 
ma de a telling contribution in relatıon to transition to peace and 
democracy in the former communist Eastern European states. 
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 1.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Dec. 10, 
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 2.  The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
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what/european-council/the-european-convention-on-human-rights-and-the-european-
court-of-human-rights (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
  
2017  The Concept of Democracy 
196 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................196 
II. The Notion of Democracy and the Convention ..........................199 
III. Democratic Rights and the Convention .....................................201 
IV. The Notion of Democracy and Relevant Articles of the 
Convention .............................................................................202 
IV.A. Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family 
Life ..................................................................................205 
IV.B Article 8 and Personal Correspondence ........................206 
IV.C Article 9: Freedom of Religion and Belief ....................208 
IV.D Democracy as a limit on restricting freedom of 
religion ............................................................................210 
IV.E Article 10: Freedom of Expression ...............................211 
IV.E(i) Freedom of Expression and Transition to 
Democracy .................................................................213 
IV.F Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association .......215 
IV.G The Convention Rights and Political parties ................219 





 The heinous atrocities committed in the course of the World 
War II, produced a flurry of aspirational and binding documents and 
treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).3  However, European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (Convention) is undoubtedly the most effec-
tive human rights instrument ever devised.  Since its enactment, the 
Convention has been a standard-setting text for transition to peace 
 
 3.  A Short History of Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND NOW (Nancy Flowers 
ed.), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
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and democracy throughout Europe.4  It is worth noting that the Coun-
cil of Europe is no longer limited to the Western European states.5  
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, geographic and cultural influence of the Convention has pro-
gressed eastward and now encompasses all of the former Soviet East-
ern Bloc states.6  In fact, at present, forty-seven countries represent-
ing 800 million citizens have now recognized the right of their 
citizens to bring cases against them at the European Court of Human 
Rights (Court).7  The Convention is also becoming increasingly a 
source of legal inspiration in other legal jurisdictions.  The Conven-
tion was created as a standard-setter and upholder of liberal democra-
cy in Europe, and ever since the issue of democracy has been one of 
its inseparable fundamental features.8 Therefore, the Convention was 
 
 4.  Klass and Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (1978). Soering 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 88  Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989). 
 5.  Under Statute of the Council of Europe 5 U.N.T.S. 103, a member state ‘must accept 
the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ The significance of the Convention’s role 
in giving meaning to these obligations has been highlighted in recent years by the fact 
that becoming a party to the Convention is now a political obligation of membership of 
the Council of Europe: EUR. CONS. ASS., Honouring Commitments Entered Into by 
Member States When Joining the Council of Europe, 14th Sess., Doc. No. 7037 (1994), 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
EN.asp?fileid=16442&lang=en. 
 6.  For example, Russia which ratified the Convention in May 1998 and Georgia which 
only joined the Council of Europe in April 1999 and ratified the Convention in June 
1999. Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
Sep. 21, 1970 C.E.T.S. No. 14 (http://assembly.coe.int). See generally James A. 
Sweeney, Divergence and Diversity in Post-Communist European Human Rights Cas-
es, 21 CONN. J. OF INT’L L. 1 (2005). 
 7.  The Court in Brief, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
 8.  Indeed, in the preamble to the Convention, a clear link is established between the 
Convention and liberal democracy by stating that the maintenance and furtherance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms can only be safeguarded by an effective liber-
al democracy and a common understanding and observance of human rights. Further-
more, the preamble goes on to assert that European countries have a common heritage 
of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, which are the principles of 
liberal democracy and the underlying values of the Convention itself. See generally 
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. OF 
INT’L L. 46 (1992); see also Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An Interna-
tional Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N. Y. U. J. OF INT’L L. AND POL. 
289, 295 (1995); STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
  
2017  The Concept of Democracy 
198 
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a demo-
democratic society.9 
 The ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the Convention unequivocally 
states that it was created to “prevent rebirth of totalitarianism”, to 
“defend our people from dictatorship”, and to “strengthen the 
resistance in all our countries against insidious attempts to undermine 
our way of life”.10  The Convention goes on to impress upon the 
citizens of member countries of the Council of Europe that it would 
“define and guarantee the political basis of this association of 
European nations” and  “ensure that member states of the Council of 
Europe are democratic and remain democratic” while providing a 
“code of law for the democracies.”11 
 The European Convention on Human Rights was a direct 
product of the immediate post-war era to unify Europe.12  The 
Convention was a reaction to the serious human rights abuses that 
Europe had witnessed in the course of the Second World War.13  But 
“it can also be viewed in the context of the much longer struggle to 
secure respect for personal autonomy, the inherent dignity of persons, 
and equality of all men and women.”14 
 The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention) asserts that European countries have a common 
heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, 
which are the principles of liberal democracy and the underlying 
 
 9.  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, App. Nos.: 5095/71, 5920/72 and 
5926/72, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (1976) HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 10.  Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the “Travaux préparatoires”of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, vol. 1, 30, 192; vol. 5, 332 (1975-1985). 
 11.  Id. at 4, 50, 60. 
 12.  The main reason for the Convention was partly the need to elaborate on the Council of 
Europe membership obligations and commitments. See European Convention of Hu-
man Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 231 U.N.T.S. 221, C.E.T.S. 5, U.K.T.S. 71, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (entered into force 3 Sep-
tember 1953, Council of Europe, at 28 October 2013, hereinafter cited as ‘Conven-
tion’).  
 13.  See generally DJ HARRIS, ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 1 (3d ed. 2014) (For the framers, democracy was given a vivid significance, in 
contrast to the recent experience of “fascism, hitlerism, and communism.”).  
 14.  CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (5th 
ed. 2010); Susan Marks, The European Convention on Human Rights and its ‘Demo-
cratic Society’, in BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-10 (1995). 
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values of the Convention itself.15  Hence, it is fair to say that the 
Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and 
values of a democratic society.16  Moreover, the Convention was to 
achieve all this by providing a collective guarantee, if not of all 
applicable rights and freedoms, then at least of those considered 
“essential for a democratic way of life.”17 
 Since its creation, the European Court of Human Rights (Court) 
has had to preside over many cases in which the question of 
democracy and its concept within the framework of the Convention 
as well as the rights of anti-democratic actors in a liberal democracy 
have been dealt with.18  This article will deal with relevant articles of 
the Convention, which encapsulate the concept of democracy through 
the case-law of the Court and how its jurisprudence has evolved in 
this regard since the 1950s.  In doing so, this article will look into the 
Courts conception of democracy in such areas as the essential 
requirements of any political system based on liberal democracy. 
II.  The Notion of Democracy and the Convention 
 The drafters of the Convention devoted a prominent role to 
promotion of pluralism and democracy in Western European states 
by incorporating the idea of democracy as a cornerstone to protect the 
right of the individual.19  The notion of a ‘democratic society’ 
permeates the entire European Convention system.  In the preamble 
to the 1949 statute of the Council of Europe, the participating states 
reaffirm “their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are 
common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual 
 
 15.  In the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention), a clear 
link is established between the Convention and liberal democracy by stating that the 
maintenance and furtherance of human rights and fundamental freedoms can only be 
safeguarded by an effective liberal democracy as well as a common understanding and 
observance of human rights. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No: 14038/88, Series 
A-161, para 88.  
 16.  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, App. Nos.: 5095/71, 5920/72 and 
5926/72 Series A-23, p. 27. 
 17.  Supra note 10, 43-4. 
 18.  See generally infra note 19. 
 19.  Warsaw Declaration, WARSAW SUMMIT COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
www.coe.int/t/dcr/summit/20050517_decl_ 
varsovie_en.asp (The current mandate of the Council of Europe was established at a 
summit which took place in Warsaw in 2005); See also Bowman v. United Kingdom, 
26 E.H.R.R. 1 (1998). 
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freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form 
the basis of all genuine democracy.”20  The Strasbourg organs have 
emphasized the point that “democracy does not simply mean that the 
views of the majority must always prevail” but, “a balance must be 
achieved which ensures fair and proper treatment of minorities and 
avoid abuse of a dominant position.”21 
 In recent decades, the Court has turned its attention to the 
fundamental link between the substantive rights guaranteed by the 
Convention and the concept and existence of democracy within the 
member states.22 There is no doubt that the Court considers qualities 
such as pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, equality, liberty and 
encouraging self-fulfilment as important characteristics of any 
functioning democracy.23  On the question of the relationship 
between democracy and the Convention the Grand Chamber in its 
unanimous decision in the case of the United Communist Party of 
Turkey v. Turkey held: 
That is apparent, firstly, from the preamble to the Convention, 
which establishes a very clear connection between the Convention 
and democracy by stating that the maintenance and further realisation 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the 
one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a 
common understanding and observance of human rights.24 
 Moreover, in its Grand Chamber decision in Gorzelik and others 
v Poland the ECtHR defined pluralism as ‘the genuine recognition of, 
and respect for, diversity and dynamics of cultural conditions, ethnic 
 
 20.  Statute of the Council of Europe, EUROPEAN TREATY SERIES - NO. 1, 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon 
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680306052. 
 21.  Sorensen v. Denmark and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Apps. 52562/99 and 52620/99, 
11January 2006 [GC], (2008) 46 EHRR 752, para. 58; see also the older case of 
Young, James and Webster v. UK, 13 August 1981, ECHR Series A, No. 44, para. 63. 
 22.  Sweeney, J.A., The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era: Uni-
versality in Transition, Routledge, 2012, p. 19.  
 23.  Oberschlik v. Austria, No. 11662/85, Series A, No. 204, 23.5.91, para. 58; see also 
Ovey, and White, European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., p. 326; Merrills, 
J.G., “The Development of International law by the European Court of Human 
Rights”, Manchester U.P., 1993, especially chapter 8, ‘Human Rights and Democratic 
Values’. 
 24.  The United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 121. 
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and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-
economic ideas and concepts.’25 
III. Democratic Rights and the Convention 
 The centrality of democracy to the Convention system does not 
mean that the precise form of democracy ımplied by the convention 
particularly clear.26  Nonetheless, the Court has consistently 
maintained that at the heart of the notion of democracy is based on 
the full participation of all the citizens of the high contracting 
parties.27  Participatory democracy includes ‘the formal conception of 
majority rule which concerns the method of decision-making and, 
over and above this requirement, also demand that the majority 
respect the equal worth of all citizens.28  Therefore, democracy is the 
only political model that the Convention aims for and finds 
compatible with it.29  In a democracy, however, it is assumed that 
limitations on individual rights and freedoms for the common good or 
to protect more compelling rights of others would be justified.30 
 As a democracy is based on the equal worth of individuals, at 
least certain human rights must be protected.  In particular, political 
rights, such freedom of expression, the right to vote, and the freedom 
of assembly are understood as vital for a functioning democracy. 
Democracy must also be understood to require the protection of other 
human rights, such as the right to family life and correspondence and 
the right to religion.  Therefore, according to the Court Articles 8, 9, 
10 and 11 of the Convention encapsulate the concept of democracy 
have common features which may require interference with the use of 
the rights set out by these articles.31 
 
 25.  Gorzelik and others v Poland, App. 44158/98, 17 February 2004, para.  92. 
 26.  Sweeney, J.A., The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, op. 
cit., p. 148. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  G. Lautenbach, The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human 
Rights, Oxford U.P., 2013, p. 65. 
 29.  O’Connell, R.O., “Towards a Stronger Concept of Democracy in the Strasbourg Con-
vention”, European Human Rights Law Review (2006) 281. 
 30.  See generally Higgins, R., “Derogations under Human Rights Treaties”, (1978) 48 
British Yearbook of International law; Marks, “the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its “Democratic Society”“, op. cit., p. 212. 
 31.  Zdanoka v. Latvia, Appl. No. 58278/00 (2006) ¶115; see also G Van de Schyff, The 
Concept of Democracy as an Element of the European Convention, 38 THE COMP. & 
INT’L LAW J. OF S. AFR. (2005). 
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 These interferences must be evaluated by the benchmark of 
what is “necessary in a democratic society.”32  The only type of 
necessity to justify interference can only derive from a “democratic 
society.”33  If a restriction on democracy is prescribed by law, the 
Court then would consider whether the law, or rather the way in 
which it was applied, is “necessary in a democratic society” for any 
of the reasons outlined in the Articles.34  Hence, the Court has 
developed the approach that states have a “margin of appreciation” in 
deciding whether a particular restriction on a right is required in the 
given circumstance.35  In the case of Handyside the Court stated: 
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact 
content of these requirement as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a 
‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ to meet them.36 
The Court also goes on to say: 
Whilst the adjective ‘necessary’  . . .is not synonymous with 
“indispensable”, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 
“admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”. 
Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the 
notion of “necessary in this context.37 
IV. The Notion of Democracy and Relevant Articles of the 
Convention 
 As noted briefly above, through its case-law the Court has 
identified certain provisions of the Convention, which clearly 
encapsulate the concept of a democratic society38  On this point it has 
 
 32.  Conor Gearty, Democracy and Human Rights in the European Court of Human 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal (2000) 51 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 381, 388.  
 33.  G.H. FOX, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2000). 
 34.  IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 593 (Oxford U.P. 6th ed. 2012).  
 35.  See generally YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHSHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND 
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (Interesentia 
2002).  
 36.  Handyside v. United Kingdom (No. 24), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 1, 17-19 (1976).  
 37.  Id. at58.  
 38.  Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R 116, 138 (Eur. Comm’n 
on H.R.).  
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been noted that, “in relation to the Convention proper, the Court’s 
conception of democracy is only elucidated incidentally-through 
consideration of the democratic rights contained in the convention.”39  
The substantive rights that are considered to comprise the concept of 
democracy are easily identified.40  Express reference to the concept of 
democracy may be seen in the second paragraphs of Articles 8-11 of 
the Convention as well as Articles 2(3) and (4) of the Fourth 
Protocol.41 
Each of the Articles 8-11 set out a Convention right in the first 
paragraph, and set out possible qualifications to the right in their 
second paragraph as a means of right-restrictive measures.42  In spite 
of some “differences of detail in the nature of the limitations arising 
under each article, there is sufficient commonality of approach to 
justify a collective consideration of these limitations before 
examining the substantive rights protected under each of these 
articles.”43  The Court has explicated that “there is undoubtedly a link 
between all of these provisions, namely the need to guarantee respect 
for pluralism of opinion in a democratic society through the exercise 
of civic and political freedom.”44 
 Initially, in regards to the concept of democracy, the Court 
considered Articles 10 protecting “Freedom of Expression” and 
Article 11 “freedom of Assembly and association” as the more 
relevant articles to the concept of democracy and democratic 
process.45  This transpires in four ways, “through judgements on 
Articles 10 and 11, which guarantee freedom of expression and 
association respectively, on merits of applications and through 
Article 17 in decisions on admissibility, also relevant is the rather 
 
 39.  Paul Harvey, Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights, 3 
EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 407, 412 (2004).  
 40.  JAMES A. SWEENEY, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA: UNIVERSALITY IN TRANSITION 151 (2013).  
 41.  See HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 341-60 (1995). 
 42.  Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, App. No. 50963/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002). 
 43.  JACOBS & WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 308 (Clare Ovey 
& Robin C.A. White eds., 4th ed. 2006). See also STEVEN GREER, THE EXCEPTIONS TO 
ARTICLES 8 TO 11 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997). 
 44.  Zdanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., 36 (2006). 
 45.  Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976); Lingens v. 
Austria, App. No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R., 13 (1986); Oberschlik v. Austria, No. 
11662/85, Eur. Ct. H.R.,17 (1991). 
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weaker protection offered by Article 3 of Additional Protocol No.1 
(hereinafter Article 3 of Protocol No. 1), which obligates member 
states to hold free elections.”46  Article 17 of the Convention sets out 
prohibition from the use of Convention rights from implying: “Any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at 
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
Convention.”47  Therefore, Article 17 prevents member states from 
abusing the Convention rights, curtailing the rights and freedoms of 
others, in other words, providing a safety mechanism specifically 
designed to prohibit totalitarian movements from using human rights 
as a means of furthering their cause.48 
 Nonetheless, it has been noticed elsewhere that freedom of 
expression under Article 10 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which 
provides the guarantee of free elections held at reasonable intervals 
are the two provisions of the Convention, “embodied the 
characteristics of a democratic society.”49  The Court has stressed that 
“eminence of freedom of expression in a democratic society of which 
it is one of the essential foundations and one of the most basic 
conditions for its progress and of each individual’s self-fulfilment.”50  
In recent decades, Article 8 which protects “private and family life, 
home and correspondence,” and Article 9 which protects “freedom of 
religion and belief,” have also been considered by the Court in 
relation to the general concept of democracy.51 
 
 46.  Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). 
 47.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11, 
1950. 
 48.  Vona v. Hungary, App. No. 35943/10, (2013), para. 34 (The Court has observed that 
“the general purpose of Article 17 is to prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting in 
their own interests the principles enunciated by the Convention”); Communist Party 
(KPD) v. Germany, No. 250/57, (1957), Yearbook 1, p. 222, para. 86-89. 
 49.  ALISTAIR MOWBRAY, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY, 704 (1999).  
 50.  DELFI AS v. Estonia, No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 78, (2013). 
 51.  See Halford v. United Kingdom, 20605/92 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 24; Leander v. Sweden, 
9248/81 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 9; M.D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN EUROPE 282-284 (2008) (The Court has considered these articles particularly 
in relation to the issue of personal correspondence). 
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IV.A. Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life 
 Article 8 of the Convention protects four connected rights.52  
Those include the right to private and family life and the right to 
respect for home and correspondence.53  Each one of these rights is 
“autonomous” and the Court is not constrained by any national 
interpretation of them.54 The Court consistently has refrained from 
providing a comprehensive definition of private life.55  Article 12 of 
the Convention complements Article 8, guaranteeing the right to 
marry and find a family.56  In addition, the member states of the 
Council of Europe have decided to reinforce the equality of spouses 
in family life by adopting Article 5 of the Seventh Protocol.57 
Article 8 places on states the obligation to respect a wide range 
of personal interest.58  Article 8 secures not only negative but also 
positive aspects of the rights in question.59  The Court has spelt out 
the dual nature of Article 8 rights: “Although the object of Article 8 
is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary inter-
ference by the public authorities, it may involve the authorities’ 
 
 52.  IVANA ROAGNA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) (According to Article 8 
of the Convention: “1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authori-
ty with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.”). 
 53.  See generally IVANA ROAGNA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND 
FAMILY LIFE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) (regarding 
Article 8 of the Convention). 
 54.  DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 516 
(3rd ed. 2014). 
 55.  Niemietz v. Germany, 13710/88 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 29.  
 56.  See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 30141/04 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 49 (Article 12 of the Con-
vention states that “men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to 
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”). 
 57.  Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. 117, Nov. 1, 1988 (Article 5 of the Seventh Proto-
col states that “spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private 
law character between then, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage, 
during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. This article shall not prevent states 
from taking such measures as are necessary in the interest of the children”.). 
 58.  DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 516 
(3rd ed. 2014). 
 59.  Marckx v. Belgium, 6833/74 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 31. 
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adopting measures designed to secure respect for private life and 
home even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves.”60  On one hand, the state in question is obliged not to 
interfere with the domain of private and family life, home, or 
correspondence.  On the other, the state is required to take particular 
necessary measures to realize the effective enjoyment of these rights. 
IV.B Article 8 and Personal Correspondence 
 When the Court finds a particular measure to be in 
“interference” with the rights embodied under the first paragraph of 
Article 8, it must consider whether such interference may be justified 
by the conditions laid down in the second paragraph.61  The standard 
formula developed in the case law is common to other personal 
freedoms set out in Articles 9 – 11.  A violation of Article 8 can only 
be justified providing it is “in accordance with the law,” has a 
“legitimate aim,” and is “necessary in a democratic society.”62 
 The issue of interference with correspondence by national 
authorities has presented a new challenge to the court in recent 
decades.  Correspondence includes postal correspondence, telephone 
calls, emails, and text messages.63  According to the court, such 
interferences include opening, reading, censoring or deleting 
correspondence violates Article 8 of the Convention.  The 
controversial issues of surveillance of communication and a 
prisoner’s right to correspondence have recently been under sharp 
scrutiny.64 
 
 60.  See Dees v. Hungary, 2345/06 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 21; Airey v. Ireland, 6289/73 Eur. Ct. 
H. R. ¶ 32; X and Y v. Netherlands, 8978/80 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 23. 
 61.  BERNADETTE RAINEY, ELIZABETH WICKS & CLARE OVEY, JACOBS, WHITE & OVEY: 
The European Convention on Human Rights 310-312 (2014).  
 62.  DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, EDWARDS BATES & CARLA BUCKLEY, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 344 (2014). 
 63.  Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984) (for interception 
of telephone calls).; Halfords v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 20605/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1997) (for email).; Golders v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 4451/70, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1975) (for post).  
 64.  Kennedy v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 26839/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).; see 
Klamecki v. Poland (no. 2), Appl. No. 31583/96, Eur. Ct. H.R.  at 144 (2003); Kucera 
v. Slovakia, Appl. No. 48666/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 127 (2007); see also Mowbray, A., 
European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford U.P. at 561-589 (For a review of the 
relevant case law). 
  
ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. V. No. II 
207 
 Therefore, in order to curb member state’s discretionary powers, 
the Strasbourg organs have required that the law in question must be 
accessible and foreseeable.65  In particular, the “foreseeability test” 
provides a crucial safeguard for the citizen by requiring the law to be 
“sufficiently clear” and precise and by giving “adequate indication” 
as to the circumstances in which and conditions on which any secret 
surveillance or interceptive measures are employed.66  Another 
implication of the foreseeability test is the requirement that adequate 
safeguard against possible abuses must be provided clearly 
demonstrating the extent of the authorities’ discretion and defining 
the circumstances in which it is to be exercised.67  In other areas of 
complaints under Article 8, by contrast, the first standard has rarely 
been contested, and the Convention bodies have focused their 
examination on the third standard; “necessary in a democratic 
society.”68 
 The best example of this judicial oversight by the court was 
when it presided over a series of cases involving British citizens 
alleging illegal interception of their correspondence.69  The Court 
held that due to the fact that there was no domestic law to regulate 
such activities there had been a breach of Article 8 by the United 
Kingdom.70  These rulings prompted the British government to fill 
this lacuna by enacting the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000.71  As a consequence of this Act, the telephone tapping civil 
cases in the United Kingdom are now brought under Article 8 of the 
Convention as in the most recent case, brought by a number of 
British politicians and celebrities against the Metropolitan Police.72  
They successfully argued that there was a breach of Article 8 since 
the police had failed to inform them about the telephone hacking and 
 
 65.  Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 56 (1979). 
 66.  See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 26839/05, 18 May 2010, ¶ 119; see also 
Klass and Others v. Germany, Appl. No. 5029/71, 6 September 1978, ¶ 33. 
 67.  Michaud v. France, Appl. No. 12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 88, ¶ 88 (2012).  
 68.  See Malone v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984); see also 
Halfords v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 20605/92, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Copland v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 62617/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41 (2001).  
 71.  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23 (Eng.). 
 72.  Phone hacking: Met police failed to warn victims, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-16922305. 
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had failed in their duty to carry out a thorough investigation as part of 
its positive duty under Article 8.73 
 Moreover, it is worth noting that the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation plays a pivotal role in the development of Article 8 case 
law providing states a certain degree of discretion particularly in 
certain areas where the court is reluctant to impede the decisions 
made by states in relation to issues “where a different approach is 
justified by local conditions.”74  Nonetheless, in this regard, the court 
has shown willingness to keep the extent of the margin of 
appreciation under review through the development of its 
jurisprudence.75 
IV.C Article 9: Freedom of Religion and Belief 
 Article 9 of the Convention protects the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion.76  In recent years, academic 
discussion of religious freedom in Europe and its relation to the 
concept of democracy has been dominated by the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights under Article 9 of the 
Convention.77  Moreover, Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
of the Convention may be relevant to freedom of religion cases.78  
Hence, the Court has reiterated that Article 9 is not simply “one of 
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believer,” 
but also “a precious asset for atheists, sceptics, and the 
unconcerned.”79  The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
 
 73.  Bryant & Ors., R (on the application of) v. The Commissioner of Police of the Me-
tropolis [2011] EWHC 1314 (Admin) (Eng.). 
 74.  D.J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE & C. WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 363 (1995). 
 75.  Valentino Acatrinei v. Rom., App. No. 18540/04, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2013). 
 76.  According to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, protecting the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: (1) Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in a community with others and in pub-
lic or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and ob-
servance. (2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedom of others. 
 77.  NORMAN DOE, LAW AND RELIGION IN EUROPE 40 (2011). 
 78.  SAMANTHA KNIGHTS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, MINORITIES, AND THE LAW 56 (2007). 
 79.  Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, App. No. 24645/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (1999). 
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religion is unqualified80  This includes the right to hold a religion or 
belief and to change it.81  For the Article to apply, a belief must 
“attain a certain a level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance,” and more importantly, by the possible qualifications in 
Article 9(2).82  This allows the state to interfere with the right if the 
three tests in Article 9(2) are met.83  The interference must be 
“prescribed by law,” have one of the legitimate aims listed in Article 
9(2) and be “necessary in a democratic society.”84 
 Despite the importance and the extent of interests protected by 
Article 9, some observers have argued that due to the cautious 
approach adopted by the Court and the Commission in the early days 
of the Convention, traditionally, relatively few applications were 
made alleging violations of Article 9; only a small proportion of 
those have given rise to successful claims.85  The case-law related to 
this right is very recent, with the first judgment finding a violation of 
this article only delivered in the much referred to Kokkinakis case in 
1993.86 
 However, since then a rich and often controversial jurisprudence 
has begun to develop, including two judgments on Turkish attempts 
to ban the wearing of Muslim headscarves in certain higher education 
establishments; the fallout from Publication of cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad in Denmark in 2005, and the Grand Chambers 
reversal of the judgment backing a challenge to the display of the 
Christian crucifix in Italian state schools.87  There is no doubt that 
 
 80.  RUSSELL SANDBERG, LAW AND RELIGION 82 (2011). 
 81.  Id..  
 82.  Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, Appl. 7511/76 and 7743/76, 25 February 
1982, Series A No. 48, (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para. 36. 
 83.  Sandberg, R., Law and Religion, op. cit., p. 82. 
 84.  Id.. 
 85.  Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op. 
cit., p 425. 
 86.  Kokiknakis v Greece, Appl. no. 14307/88, 25 May 1993, 17 EHHR 379. On the Kok-
kinakis case; see Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, op. cit., 
pp. 282-84, 332-35.   
 87.  Leyla Şahin v Turkey (GC), 18 March 2011, Appl. No. 30814/06) and discussed in 
Altıparmak, K. & Karahanoğulları, O., “after Şahin: the Debate on Headscarves is not 
Over”, European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2006) 268, McGoldrick, D., Human 
Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe, Oxford: Hart, 
2006.BBC Website, “Special Report, the Muhammad cartoon row”, 7 February 2006, 
available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/4677976.stm> at 28 October 
2013.Lautsi v. Italy, (GC), 18 March 2011 (Appl. No. 30814/06). 
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Switzerland’s attempt to ban the construction of new minarets will 
also give rise to some thought-provoking legal arguments.88 
IV.D Democracy as a limit on restricting freedom of religion 
 Justifying a restriction on religion or belief, and the extent to 
which it is “necessary in a democratic society,” has often been a 
controversial issue.89  In line with other international human rights 
instruments on religious liberty, Article 9 enshrines the rights in the 
first paragraph, and provides for the possible qualifications to the 
right in the second paragraph.  The qualifications of Article 9 are 
slightly different to the other personal freedoms since they pertain 
only the manifestation of religion or belief (the forum externum), 
rather than the act or state of believing itself (the forum internum).  
Interpreting the scope of Article 9 (1) has been rather challenging, 
and the European Commission’s decision in Arrowsmith v. United 
Kingdom, that not all actions motivated by religious belief fall within 
it, has been met with some criticism.90 
 In applying the limitations contained in Article 9 (2), the Court 
has been rather sensitive to varied constitutional traditions of the 
member states, notwithstanding the fact that this approach has been 
criticized by certain scholars.91  The main characteristic of Article 9 
in relation to this study is the extent to which the Court has 
recognised a strong link between religion and a democratic society.  
According to the Court, “freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning 
of the Convention.”92  In this manner, Article 9 needs to be 
interpreted in light of other Convention rights, such as the Article 11, 
the right of assembly and association.93  Consequently, interference 
with the rights stipulated in Article 9 may be examined not only as an 
 
 88.  BBC Website, “Swiss Minaret Appeal goes to European Court” (16.12.2009) availa-
ble at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8417076.stm> at 28 October 2013. 
 89.  Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op. 
cit., p. 437. 
 90.  Evans, C., Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Oxford U.P., 2001, p. 115.  
 91.  Ibid. 
 92.  Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000 *Appl. No. 30985/96) para. 60; Serif 
v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 20. 
 93.  Id., para. 62.  
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infringement on the applicant’s own religion or beliefs, but also as an 
indirect violation on the democratic fabric of society.94 
 Restrictions on Article 9 must comply with the conditions 
specified in Article 9 (2).  They must be prescribed by law and be 
necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.95  These specific “interests” are 
more commonly referred to in the European jurisprudence as 
“legitimate aims.”96  It is also important to note that other major 
international human rights instruments adopt the same approach to 
the issue of religious belief by striking a balance between the 
“legitimacy” of restrictions and their “necessity” to limiting freedom 
of religion.97 
IV.E Article 10: Freedom of Expression 
 Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression, which has been 
described as “one of the cardinal rights guaranteed under the 
Convention.”98  This notion comprises the actual freedom of 
 
 94.  Sweeney, J.A., “Freedom of Religion and Democratic Transition”, in Buyse, A. & 
Hamilton, M. (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and 
Rights, Cambridge U.P., 2011, P. 105.  
 95.  Id.. 
 96.  Id..  
 97.  Freedom of religion is protected in all other major international and regional human 
rights instruments, including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), Article 3 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(American Declaration), Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) and Article 8 of the African Charter on Human People’s Rights (ACHRP). 
 98.  According to Article 10 of the Convention: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by pub-
lic authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from re-
quiring the licencing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprise. 
2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, ter-
ritorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. See generally Macovei, M., “Freedom of 
Expression: A to Implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2, 2nd edition, 2004. 
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expression, freedom of information, freedom of communication via 
mass media, and specific parts of the freedom of artistic and 
academic expression.99  Indeed, the marked importance of this right 
and the demand for its special protection due to its close linkage to 
democracy’s political process is an indispensable part of the 
Convention.100  The Court has consistently maintained that states are 
under obligation to ensure that private individuals can effectively 
exercise their right of communication between themselves.101 
 Furthermore, freedom of political debate is at the very core of 
the concept of democratic society, which prevails throughout the 
convention.102  The Court has repeatedly reiterated that “freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of democratic 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each 
individual’s self-fulfilment.”103  The convention has underlined the 
need for transparency and accountability on the part of the high 
contracting states.104  In ascertaining whether a positive obligation to 
act exists in a particular situation, certain”regard must be had to the 
fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and interests of individuals.”105 
 The most protected class of expression has been political 
expression, since the Court considers such expression as an essential 
part of any effective pluralist democracy, in order to ensure respect 
for fundamental human rights.106  The court has emphasised this point 
forcefully that “in a democratic system, the acts or omissions of the 
government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only the 
 
 99.  Grabenwarter, C., European Convention on Human Rights: Commentary, Beck/Hart 
Publishing, 2014, P. 252. 
 100.  Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op. 
cit., p.443. 
 101.  Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, 28 EHRR, para. 46, Report of Judgments and 
Decisions 1998-VI; Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 68416/01, 15 Feb-
ruary 2005, para. 87; and Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom [GC], 
Appl. No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, para. 100. 
 102.  Lingens v. Austria, Series A no. 103, 8 July 1986, para. 41. 
 103.  Thoma v. Luxemburg, Appl. No. 38432/97, 29 June 2001. 
 104.  OOO Ivpress and Others v. Russia, App. No. 33501/04, 38608/04, 35258/05 and 
35618/05, 22 January 2013, para. 55; see also Council of Europe, Committee of minis-
ters, “Declaration on freedom of political debate in the Media”, Adopted by the Com-
mittee of ministers on 12 February at the 872nd meeting of the Ministers deputies. 
Available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=118995> at 28 October 2013. 
 105.  Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23144/93, 16 March 2000, para. 43. 
 106.  Mowbray, European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., p. 626. 
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legislative and judicial authorities but also the press and public opin-
opinion.”107 This point was reiterated in the United Communist Party 
of Turkey case, in which the court considered pluralism at the heart of 
its conception of democracy.108  Hence, the court firmly puts the onus 
on the member states as the “ultimate guarantors of the principle of 
pluralism”, especially in the context of media.109 
 As the Court famously held in Handyside v. United Kingdom, 
even opinions which “shock, offend, or disturb” should be 
tolerated.110 In line with this the Court in the case of Vajnai v. 
Hungary has reiterated that: 
A Legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in 
order to satisfy the dictates of public feelings – real or imaginary – 
cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs recognised in 
democratic society, since the society must remain reasonable in its 
judgment. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and 
opinion is subjected to the heckler’s veto.111 
In the recent case of Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others v. Turkey, the 
Court reiterated the importance of freedom of expression as “one of 
the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic 
conditions for its progress and for each individual self-fulfilment”.112 
IV.E(i) Freedom of Expression and Transition to Democracy 
 In recent decades, both the Court and the Commission have 
acknowledged that in a transition to democracy it may be legitimate 
to curtail forms of speech which are very critical of the state.113  As 
Judge Carrillo Salcedo in the case of Castells v. Spain observed: 
 
 107.  The interest which the public may have in particular information can sometimes be so 
strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of confidence. Guja v. Moldova, No. 
14277/04, 12 February 2008; see also Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 
29183/95, ECHR 1999-I, and Radio Twist, a.s. v. Slovakia, no. 62202/00, ECHR 
2006-XV. 
 108.  United Communist Party of Turkey, op. cit, para 43. 
 109.  Manole and Others v. Moldova, Appl. No. 13936/02, 17 September 2009, para. 107. 
 110.  Handyside v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49. 
 111.  Vajnai v. Hungary, Appl. No. 33629, 8 July 2008, para. 57.  
 112.  Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 28255/07, 8 October 2013, para. 
56. 
 113.  Buyse, A., “The Truth, the Past and the Present: Article 10 ECHR and Situations of 
transition”, in Buyse, A. & Hamilton, M. (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the 
ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights, Cambridge U.P., 2011, P. 132.  
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In a situation where politically motivated violence poses a con-
constant threat to the lives and security of the population, it is 
particularly difficult to strike a balance between the requirements of 
protecting freedom of expression and the imperatives of protecting 
the democratic state.114 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and accession of all of 
the former Soviet Bloc states in Europe to the Council of Europe, the 
Court has been faced with an entirely different challenge of 
transitional democracies in those states.115  Nevertheless, the 
Convention “to which most central and Eastern European countries 
acceded in the years immediately following the demise of communist 
regimes, was a crucial signpost on the road to democracy and the rule 
of law.”116  It is worth noting that such challenges were not limited to 
the former Soviet Bloc states and the Court had previously faced 
similar tasks in the case of Southern European states.117 
 Although, the process of transition does not prompt the Court to 
deviate from its established jurisprudence but the Court’s judgments 
on the freedom of expression are of particular salience to transitional 
process.118  Therefore, the Court’s case-law has strongly adopted an 
approach in which information exchange and pluralities of opinions 
is of paramount importance in any democratic society, therefore, 
restoring a balance between the citizens’ fundamental rights and the 
state–a balance completely void in the era of authoritarian rule in the 
former communist states of Eastern Europe.119 
 
 114.  Concurring Opinion of Judge Carrillo Salcedo; Castells v. Spain, Appl. No. 11798/85, 
8 January 1991. 
 115.  Leuprecht, P., “Innovations in the European System of Human Rights Protection: Is 
Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?,” 8 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs., 
313, (1998) pp. 313-14; see also Fein, E., “Transitional Justice and Democratization in 
Eastern Europe”, in May, R.A. and Hamilton, A.K. (eds.) (Un) Civil Societies, Lan-
ham: Lexington Books, 2005, pp. 197-223.  
 116.  Buyse, “The Truth, the Past and the Present: Article 10 ECHR and Situations of tran-
sition”, op. cit., p. 148. 
 117.  See generally Schmitter, P., “An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey”, in O’Donnell, G., 
Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern 
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1986.). 
 118.  Buyse, “The Truth, the Past and the Present: Article 10 ECHR and Situations of tran-
sition”, op. cit., p. 148. 
 119.  Id. at 149. 
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IV.F Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association 
 Freedom of assembly and association provides protection for the 
formation of collective entities by individuals for any lawful 
purpose.120  Thus, political parties play a special role within the 
guarantee of freedom of association due to their pivotal role in the 
functioning of a democratic government.121  The Grand Chamber has 
referred to ‘the primordial role played in a democratic regime by 
political parties enjoying the freedoms and rights enshrined in Article 
11 and also in Article 10 of the Convention.’122 
 Not only citizens in fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe 
but also some nationals of the more established democracies in 
Europe have had to rely on the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to 
the rights to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 of 
Convention) and the obligation upon states to hold free elections 
(Article 3, of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention).123  Article 11 
protects the two distinct if sometimes connected freedoms of peaceful 
assembly and association.124  In occasions, states have sought to 
 
 120.  Marauhn, T., ‘General Principles’ in Ehlers, D. & Becker, U. (eds.), European Fun-
damental Rights and Freedoms, de Gruyter, 2007, p. 122.  
 121.  The right to freedom of association as provided in Article 11 of the Convention reads 
as follows: 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 
2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national se-
curity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the state. 
 122.  Linkov v. The Czech Republic, no. 10504/03, para 34, 7 December 2006; Redfearn v. 
United Kingdom, no. 47335/06, para 55, 6 November 2012. 
 123.  Article 3, of Protocol No. 1, states: ‘the High Contracting Parties undertake to hold 
free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under condition which will en-
sure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’ 
Hamilton, M., “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, in Buyse, A. 
& Hamilton, M. (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and 
Rights, Cambridge U.P., 2011, 151-184, p. 151. 
 124.  Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op. 
cit., p.516. 
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justify interference with these rights in order to foster democratic 
values, in turn leading to allegations of excessive rights limitations125 
 In recent years, the Court has had to deal with the more practical 
application of the notion of democracy in regards to freedom of 
assembly and association.126  The eligibility to stand for election to a 
national parliament was examined in the case of Zdanoka v Latvia, 
which concerned refusal by the Latvian authorities to allow the 
applicant, Mrs. Tatjana Zdanoko,127 a member of the Communist 
Party of Latvia to be included on the resident’s register to stand for 
the first parliamentary elections in 1993—since Latvia’s regaining 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991128 
 The Chamber and Grand Chamber in this case adopted entirely 
different approaches to the interpretation of someone’s eligibility to 
stand for election.  On the one hand, in its Chamber judgment, the 
Court held that the electoral restrictions by the Latvian government in 
1995 had violated Mrs Zdanoka’s P 1-3 right.  The Chamber felt 
compelled to “adhere to the same criteria” permitted by Articles 8-11, 
since “the only type of necessity capable of justifying an interference 
with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may claim to 
emanate from democratic society.”129  However, the Grand Chamber 
held that: 
Where an interference with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is in issue 
the Court should not automatically adhere to the same criteria as 
those applied with regard to the interference permitted by the second 
paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention  . . . Because of the 
relevance of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the institutional order of 
the State, this provision is cast in very different terms from Articles 8 
to 11 of the Convention  . . . The standards to be applied for 
 
 125.  Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 151-
152. 
 126.  The general principle enounced in the case-law in this field are summarised in the 
case of United communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 
133/1996/752/951, Judgment of 30 January 1998, paras. 42-47.  
 127.  In February 1993 Ms Zdanoka became chairperson of the Movement for Social Jus-
tice and Equal Rights in Latvia, (Kustība par sociālo taisnīgumu un līdztiesību Lat-
vijā), which later became a political party, Līdztiesība (“Equal rights”). 
 128.  Zdanoka v Latvia, Appl. No. 58278/00, 16 March 2006; see also the older Judgment 
in the case of Gitonas v Greece, App. No. 18747/91, Judgment of 1 July 1997, 27 
EHRR 417. 
 129.  European Convention on Human Rights art. 8-11, Nov. 4, 1950.   
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establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must there-
therefore be considered to be less stringent than those applied under 
Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention.130 
Hence, the implied defense to “the institutional order of the 
state’ echoes specific reference to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.131  By 
adopting this approach the Grand Chamber established a high 
supervisory threshold in which case a violation would only take place 
if procedural deficiencies gave rise to likely arbitrary treatment.132  It 
is clear that the Grand Chamber was of the opinion that Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1 does not exclude the restrictions on electoral rights, 
since it may be imposed on “an individual who has, for example 
seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatens to 
undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations”.133 
 This approach is very much in step with Allen’s observation that 
“there is reluctance to allow the Court to be used as a forum for 
hearing disputes that have their origin in the pre-transitional era” 
since “there is a strong, though not universal, belief within the 
European Court that there is little to be gained by investigating the 
stories of victim.”134  In other words, in such cases, the contracting 
states are given considerable latitude to establish their constitutional 
rules regarding the status of parliamentarians which inevitably would 
include the criteria for disqualification.135  This would include 
ensuring the independence of members of parliament as well as 
electorate’s freedom of choice.136  The wide margin of appreciation 
given to states is mainly because each state has historical and 
political factors unique to them and the criteria would vary 
accordingly.137  Nonetheless, according to Hamilton: 
One apparent consequence of the more relaxed scrutiny of 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 is that no assessment need be made of extant 
transitional risk. This again sharpens the contrast with Articles 10 and 
 
 130.  Zdanoka v Latvia, Appl. No. 58278/00, 16 March 2006, para. 115(a).  
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11 of Convention which demand attention to the imminence of an ev-
evidenced threat.138 
However, the Court was unanimous in its decision that there had 
been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 by Latvia.139  Indeed, this 
judgement indicates the court’s concern regarding fairness of free 
elections as well as enabling states to place limitations on the senior 
holders of public office to gain electoral advantage whilst still 
connected with the prestige and powers of such offices.140 
 However, in an apparent U-turn, the Court has found violations 
of Article 3 of Protocol 1 in the cases of Adamsons v. Latvia with 
similar background.141  Some scholars have observed that the above 
two cases indicate a narrowing of the gap between Article 11 and 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 scrutiny.142  In Adamsons, the Latvian 
government had disqualified a former low-ranking officer of the 
KGB border guard from standing the 2002 general election.143  In a 
departure from the previous approach, not only did the Court 
consider the affiliation of this person’s involvement with the previous 
regime but crucially considered his activities in the society since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union which according to the Court: 
The Court considered, in the light of the particular socio-
historical background to the applicant’s case that during the first 
years after Latvia had regained independence, electoral rights could 
be substantially restricted without thereby infringing Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1. However, with the passing of time, a more general 
suspicion regarding a group of persons no longer sufficed and the 
authorities had to provide further arguments and evidence to justify 
the measure in question.144 
 
 138.  Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 157. 
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 140.  Mowbray, “the Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Promotion of 
Democracy”, op. cit., p. 708.  
 141.  Adamsons v. Latvia, Appl. No. 3669/02, 24 June 2008. French text available only, 
extract from Press release issued by the Registrar, p. 3. See also Varju, M., “Transition 
as a Concept of European Human Rights Law”, European Human Rights Review 170 
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 142.  Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 181. 
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the Registrar, p. 3. 
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 This approach has since been reiterated by the Court in the case 
of and Tanase v Moldova in which the Court held that prevention of a 
Moldovan citizen holding dual nationality from standing in for 
election “some seventeen years after Moldova had gained 
independence and five years after it had relaxed its laws to allow 
dual-citizenship” was illegal.145 
IV.G The Convention Rights and Political parties 
 As noted above, political parties are the very cornerstones of 
European democracy and the Court considers pluralism as an 
inseparable part of liberal democracy.  In order to maintain political 
debate political parties are the other crucial participants of a 
pluralistic system of government.  The court has opined that: 
Such expression is inconceivable without the participation of a 
plurality of political parties representing the different shades of 
opinion to be found within a country’s population.  By relaying this 
range of opinion, not only within political institutions but also with 
the help of media at all levels of social life, political parties make an 
irreplaceable contribution to political debate, which is at the very 
core of a democratic society.146 
 In the case of Socialist Party of Turkey v Turkey, the Court 
emphasised on the importance of pluralism in a democratic society to 
the extent that challenging existing national structure was acceptable 
only through democratic means that “it is of the essence of 
democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and 
debated, even those that call into question the way a state is currently 
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”147  
Hence, constitutional reform even of fundamental nature is a 
justifiable topic of political debate as long as the advocates are not 
seeking to undermine the very foundation of the national democratic 
system.148 
 In the early 1990s, one of the challenges for the Court’s 
jurisprudence was presented with a series of cases involving closure 
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of nine political parties in Turkey.149  In the first eight cases the 
Court’s approach was very similar in its reasoning.  The reason for 
dissolution of these political parties was that they were all striving to 
settle the Kurdish problem democratically and advocating a federal 
state comprised of a Kurdish and a Turkish nation.  The Court was of 
the opinion that it could not justify a ban and while the states could 
take measures to protect their institutions, a political party could not 
be excluded from the protection of the Convention simply because 
the activities of these political parties are regarded by the national 
authorities as undermining the constitutional structure of the state.150 
In the case of the United Communist party of Turkey and Others, the 
Court held that the mere inclusion of the word “Communist” in the 
name of the party could not justify dissolution of that party.151 
 Nonetheless, in contrast to the case of the German Communist 
party, this party posed no threat to Turkish society, as it did not 
pursue traditional communist aims.152  The Court was unanimous in 
their conclusion regarding the aforementioned parties that since they 
bore no responsibility for Kurdish terrorism, the dissolution violated 
Article 11.153  However, in contrast to these cases, the seminal 
exception was the Court’s now notorious decision in the case of 
Refah Partisi v Turkey, in which the court upheld the decision of the 
Turkish Supreme Court to ban an Islamist party.154  The coming to 
prominence by the Refah Partisi in Turkey, very much reflected the 
rise of an ‘Islamic resurgence’ at the end of the twentieth century.155  
 
 149.  United communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 
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In spite of its secular political system Turkey a predominantly Mus-
lim state was not different from other Islamic countries experiencing 
this sea change.156 
 The Court unanimously ruled that there was no violation of 
article 11, a decision vehemently criticised by some prominent 
scholars such as McGoldrick.157  This was mainly based on the fact 
that the leaders of Refah had made public speeches advocating 
imposition of Sharia law, which was considered irreconcilable with 
the notion of liberal democracy, as conceived by the Convention.158  
As Harvey puts it, “given that the party had over four million 
members this amounts to the largest single interference with freedom 
of association in European jurisprudence”.159 
 In Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) (PCN) and Ungureanu v. 
Romania, the Court found a violation of Article 11 following the 
refusal of the Bucharest Court of Appeal to register PCN as a 
political party.160  Although PCN openly purported to be a Marxist-
Leninist organization, but very much distanced itself from the former 
Romanian Communist Party that had ruled Romania during the Cold 
War period.  The Bucharest County Court held that PCN’s political 
programme aimed at “establishing a humane state based on 
communist doctrine, which would imply that the constitutional and 
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legal order in place since 1989 is inhumane and not founded on genu-
genuine democracy.”161 
 The Court in Strasbourg rejected the Romanian government’s 
argument that it could not permit “the emergence of a new 
communist party to form the subject of democratic debate”, and 
reiterated the importance of pluralism and political parties which 
applied to all of the signatories to the Convention.162  The Court 
stated that “political parties played an essential role in ensuring 
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy” as well as “there 
can be no democracy without pluralism”163  Moreover, the Court held 
that: 
The Court is also prepared to take into account the historical 
background to cases before it, in this instance Romania’s experience 
of totalitarian communism prior to 1989. However, it observes that 
that context cannot by itself justify the need for the interference, 
especially as communist parties adhering to Marxist ideology exist in 
a number of countries that are signatories to the Convention.164 
 The approach of the Court in the above case could be construed 
as quite a departure from previous case-law regarding former 
Communist Eastern European states. However, it should be pointed 
out that PCN had made it absolutely clear that it accepted pluralism, 
multiparty political system and had no affiliation with the former 
Romanian Communist Party165  On the part of the Court, in the words 
of Hamilton “the Court has demonstrated its resolve to foster a robust 
and inclusive political sphere, underpinned by the values of pluralism 
and social cohesion”.166  In this regard, the judgment of Herri 
Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain is of significance, in which the 
Court held: 
[I]t necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite 
to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy 
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or which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of 
the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim 
to the Convention’s protection against penalties imposed on those 
grounds . . . .167 
Moreover, the Court attached a caveat to the above passage by noting that: 
[A] State may “reasonably forestall the execution of such a 
policy, which is incompatible with the Convention’s provisions, 
before an attempt is made to implement it through concrete steps that 
might prejudice civil peace and the country’s democratic regime.168 
 In the recent case of Vona v. Hungary, the Court was of the 
opinion that the dissolution of the Hungarian Guard Association 
(Magyar Garda) by domestic court was lawful restriction of the 
applicant’s rights under Article 11 of the Convention.169  The said 
organization had openly advocated a racist message against the 
Romani population of Hungary. In the Court’s view: 
[T]he State is entitled to take preventive measures to protect 
democracy vis-à-vis such non-party entities as well, if a sufficiently 
imminent prejudice to the rights of others undermines the 
fundamental values upon which a democratic society rests and 
functions. One of such values is the cohabitation of members of 
society without racial segregation, without which a democratic 
society is inconceivable.170 
 The Court found that the Hungarian authorities were entitled to 
take preventive measures in order to protect democracy and proscribe 
the organization due to its racist and divisive views.171  It is the 
established case-law of the Strasbourg organs which have 
consistently maintained that there are positive obligations to secure 
the effective enjoyment of the rights contained in Article 11.172  Not 
only everyone regardless of their status or background characteristics 
(ethnicity, place of origin, religion, disability, etc.) are entitled to 
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effective enjoyment of these rights but the contracting states are un-
under obligation to prevent and remedy any breach thereof.173 
IV.H. Article 17 and the Court’s Jurisprudence 
 In the words of Pierre-Henri Teitgen, the French jurist who was 
one of the driving forces behind the drafting of the Convention which 
truly reflected the general post World War II perception that at 
certain times, democracies need to defend themselves against the 
threat of totalitarianism.174  Adoption of Article 17 of the Convention 
which is prohibition on abuse of rights and to prevent totalitarian and 
extremist groups from justifying their activities by relying on the 
Convention encapsulates this approach.175  This is exactly what the 
Court had to do in the early days of its existence.  At this stage, it is 
worth noting that the Court’s case-law regarding anti-democratic 
actors since its establishment until recent decades was mainly limited 
to Fascists and Communists applicants.176 
 It is clear that the main idea behind the first proposal for a 
Convention was to provide human rights guarantees of a very basic 
and fundamental nature as a reaction to the atrocities committed in 
the World War II and the subsequent outbreak of the Cold war.177  
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The court maintains a consistent approach of refusing to consider any 
applications in relation to fascist and racist group from any member 
states.178 
 Indeed, all such cases have been refused as inadmissible either 
as manifestly ill-founded or removed from the protection of the 
Convention on the basis of Article 17, which covers a variety of 
activities on the far right of political spectrum, such as distributing 
racist and fascist pamphlets, and denial of the Holocaust.179 It also 
discusses organising paramilitary training camps, denial of the 
Austrian state by advocating a Pan-Germanic nation, and attempts to 
revive the Fascist party in Italy.180 
 However, the only possible exception to the jurisprudence of the 
court in that period was the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 
which concerned a criminal conviction on the basis of a newspaper 
article in praise of Marshall Petain (who headed the collaborationist 
Vichy regime during the Nazi occupation of France), in which the 
court found a violation of Art.10.181  It went on to say that Art.17 
would remove the use of Art.10 to negate the Holocaust from 
protection of Art.10 but since the article had not done so, therefore, 
Art.17 was not applicable.182  Judge Jambrek in his concurring 
opinion elaborated on conditions in which Article 17 would be 
applicable since: 
The aim of the offending actions must be to spread violence or 
hatred, to resort to illegal or undemocratic methods, to encourage the 
use of violence, to undermine the nation’s democratic and pluralist 
political system, or to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to 
destroy the rights and freedom of others.183 
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 He was of the opinion that the best way to oppose the rise of an-
anti-Semitism in Europe was “free critique” in which democracies, 
unlike dictatorships, can cope with the sharpest controversies.”184  In 
relation to applicability of Article 17, he noted that “on the other 
hand the requirements of Article 17 also reflect concern for the 
defense of democratic society and its institution.”185  In contrast, the 
Court has adopted a much more ambivalent attitude towards political 
movements on the left side of the political spectrum.186  Although the 
Court after the end of the Cold War adopted a more tolerant and 
measured approach towards left-wing political movements.187 
V. Conclusion 
The concept of a ‘democratic society’ encompasses the entire 
framework of the Convention and serves as a criterion for the 
assessment of legality of state action.  The Convention entails a broad 
protection of the substantive rights that are said to be easily 
identified.188  As it has been observed, the Court has derived its 
concept of democracy from the components of the contemporary 
model of democracy in Europe from its origin, preamble and text of 
the Convention.  Indeed the drafters of the European Convention on 
Human rights adopted the notion of liberal democracy and pluralism 
as the very corner stone of the Convention.189 
 In that regard, the Court considers liberal democracy as the only 
guarantee for fundamental freedom and human rights.  The cases that 
this paper has analysed certainly reveal the Court’s adherence to 
representative democracy and free elections as well as the importance 
of transparency and accountability in public and political spheres.  
Along with reference to a ‘democratic society’ in relation to the 
qualification of rights, the substantive contents of Articles 10, 11 of 
the Convention and Article 3, Protocol I, combined provide a 
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democratic backbone to the Convention system.190  These are the 
rights to free expression, free assembly and association, and the right 
to free elections. 
 In recent decades, the Court has recognised Article 9 of the 
Convention as “one of the foundations of a democratic society within 
the meaning of the Convention.”  However, the abovementioned 
rights are not absolute and are subject to limitations set out in the 
second part of these articles.  The restrictions must be prescribed by 
law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public 
safety, for the protection public order, health morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 Furthermore, through the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” 
allows the member states certain discretion to interfere with or limit 
human rights in specific instances.  This “margin of appreciation”, 
however, is increasingly subject to oversight by the Court in order to 
ensure objective compliance with the protected rights.  This approach 
is increasingly adopted by the Court in cases concerning transitional 
democracies in former Communist totalitarian systems. 
 This paper has shown that since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and accession of all of the former European communist states to the 
Council of Europe the Court has faced a huge challenge in upholding 
and enforcing the values of democracy, since most of these states 
were new to the notion of liberal democracy.  This led to the 
emergence of new kind of applicant bringing litigation against new 
states defending those cases. 
 This new challenge has prompted the court to reiterate and 
articulate a coherent normative conception of democracy even though 
that conception is bound to be contested.  As a result, democracy in 
the context of the Convention cannot be understood merely in a 
formal sense as majority rule.  Democracy must primarily be 
understood as participatory democracy, with respect for different 
opinion and belief, and focused on freedom of expression as a means 
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